Later theories of physics and astronomy, such as classical and relativistic mechanics could account for such observations without positing a fixed Earth, and in due course they replaced the static-Earth auxiliary hypotheses and initial conditions.
Quine also notes that deviant logics usually lack the simplicity of classic logic, and are not so fruitful.
Perhaps the most important division is between what we might call holist and contrastive forms of underdetermination. This recognition makes clear why it will be extremely difficult to say how the shift to an alternative web of belief with alternative ampliative or even deductive principles of belief revision should or even can be evaluated for its rational defensibility—each proposed revision will be maximally rational by the lights of the principles it itself sanctions.
That is, we need not attempt to justify them up front as the products of sense experience, but merely subject Quine duhem thesis popper to critical scrutiny and empirical testing. One way to see why not is to consider an analogy that champions of contrastive underdetermination have sometimes used to support their case.
The story goes that Popper gradually retreated from naive falsificationism in response to criticism, such as the Duhem-Quine thesis. Popper associates this objection with conventionalism, a type of reactionary anti-realism.
The relation of observation experiences to language shall take a key place in this essay for it is here more than anywhere else that the debate shall be decided. Thus, van Fraassen argues, we are here faced with empirically equivalent scientific theories: Much of the rest of his case is taken up with discussing historical examples illustrating that earlier scientists did not simply ignore or dismiss, but instead genuinely failed to conceive of the serious, fundamentally distinct theoretical possibilities that would ultimately come to displace the theories they defended, only to be displaced in turn by others that were similarly unconceived at the time.
The argument, as we have seen, is that, in order forphysical theory to be explanatory, it would have to be subordinate tometaphysics and not autonomous.
After the prosecution has presented its case to the jury, the defence must be allowed to present its counterargument. Popper, however, explicitly repudiates these goals.
In this dissertation, I address these shortcomings and show how and what kind of experimental knowledge fNI can reliably produce which would be theoretically significant. Scientists, including the CERN team, merely presumed something else was responsible for the anomaly.
Such empirical equivalents invite the natural response that they force our theories to undertake commitments that they never should have in the first place. He says in no uncertain terms that experimental theory in physics is not the same as in fields like physiology and certain branches of chemistry.
I do not try to justify them, however, by representing them as true or essential aims of science … There is only one way, as far as I can see, of arguing rationally in support of my proposals. He divides theories into two large categories, explanatoryand purely representative theories, and argues that physical theoriesshould not be considered as explanatory, but as purely representativeor classificatory.
Were the CERN physicists wrong to assume an equipment malfunction? Quine suggested that such challenges applied not only to the confirmation of all types of scientific theories, but to all knowledge claims whatsoever, and his incorporation and further development of these problems as part of a general account of human knowledge was one of the most significant developments of 20th Century epistemology.
And as Duhem suggests above, even if we supposed that we somehow knew exactly which of our hypotheses to blame in response to a failed empirical prediction, this would not help us to decide whether or not there are other hypotheses available that are equally well-confirmed by the data we actually have.
So even if two theories are empirically equivalent at a given time this is no guarantee that they will remain so, and thus there is no foundation for a general pessimism about our ability to distinguish theories that are empirically equivalent to each other on empirical grounds.
Popper, however, explicitly repudiates these goals.The Duhem-Quine thesis casts doubt on the logic of falsification and thus on the decisive character of the crucial experiment. Duhem pointed out that the outcome of an experiment is not predicted on the basis of one hypothesis. The Quine-Duhem thesis is a form of the thesis of the underdetermination of theory by empirical evidence.
The basic problem is that individual theoretical claims are unable to be confirmed or falsified on their own, in isolation from surrounding hypotheses.
Quine-duhem thesis and Popper essays. Via a detailed analysis of Duhem’s writings some light is cast around the relations between holism, underdetermination and theory-ladenness of experimentation. The Duhem–Quine thesis, also called the Duhem–Quine problem, after Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine, is that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation, because an empirical test of the hypothesis requires one or more background assumptions (also called auxiliary assumptions or auxiliary hypotheses).
Quine thought that this background involved not only such hypotheses but also our whole web-of-belief, which, among other things, includes our mathematical and logical theories and our scientific theories.
This last claim is sometimes known. Does the Quine-Duhem thesis create insurmountable problems for Popper’s falsificationist methodology of science?
Karl Popper can be credited with positing an alternative, original methodology of science that escapes, it would appear, many of the Humean problems to induction.Download